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1 - Preliminary Remarks 
 
Islamic symbols are generally derived from religious beliefs as well as 
their manifestation in worship, observance, practice and teaching. 
Article 18 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)1 guarantees everyone “the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion” and guarantees the right to manifest one’s 
religion in observance and practice2. In a General Comment, the Human 
Rights Committee (CCPR) states explicitly that the concept of worship also 
extends “to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as 
well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of 
places of worship”3 . In fact the displaying of religious symbols is 
considered as a manifestation of religion or belief by most international 
                                                        
* Paper, evaluated, for: R. Scarciglia (ed.), Islamic Symbols in European Courts, Quaderni 
giuridici del Dipartimento di Scienze politiche e sociali, Cedam – Kluwer, Trieste, 2014. 
 
 
1 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 at 52 (1966), in force since 
3.1.1976; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, R.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) 21 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 at 52 (1966), in force since 23.3.1976. 
2 See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), GA Res. 217/A (III), 
10.12.1948, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71.  
3 Human Rights Committee (HRC), General Comment adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee under Article 40, § 4 of the ICCPR, General Comment No. 22(48), The right to 
freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 4 (July 30, 
1993), § 4: hereinafter General Comment No. 22. 
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judicial or quasi – judicial bodies. According to the Human Rights 
Committee's General Comment No 22 on Article 18 of the ICCPR,  
 
“the observance and practice of religion or belief may include not 
only ceremonial acts but also such customs as … the wearing of 
distinctive or head coverings (para.4), a viewpoint shared by the 
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief”4.  
 
From an international human right perspective, it has been 
accepted that “the wearing of distinctive clothing or head – coverings” 
constitutes part of the observance and practice of religion or belief5 
In Europe, the main problems brought before the most important 
judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights, concern islamic 
clothing symbols, and the ban adopted on them by some european States. 
Other Islamic symbols, such as buildings may be theoretically 
reconducted to the same legal framework, but have not until now 
produced significant case – law, like in the well known case of the Swiss 
ban on minarets adopted in 20096. 
The origins of these problems may be found in the fact that in most 
religious traditions, the wearing of religious clothes – i.e. the Jewish 
yarmulke, the Sikh turban, the Islamic hijab (the more commonly worn 
headscarf or foulard covering the woman’s neck and hair, but not her face), 
the niqab (a full body covering, with a veil that covers a woman’s hair and 
face, leaving only eyes visible), the chador (a black veil covering the body 
and closed under the chin, leaving the face uncovered), or the burqa (a 
loose enveloping garment, worn outside the home, covering a woman’s 
body including her face, which is hidden from view by a mesh of fabric) – 
is considered not exclusively as a matter of religious duty, ritual and 
observance7. Sometimes, veiling and unveiling are deemed to be relational 
                                                        
4 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by Asma Jahangir, Special 
Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, 16 March 2005, E/CN.4/2005/61/Corr.1, § 40, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42d66e970.html. The aim of the “general 
criteria”, developed by the UN Special Rapporteur, is to assist “national and international 
bodies in their analyses and reviews of laws and draft legislation pertaining to freedom 
of religion or belief” (§ 51). They are extremely relevant for evaluating full face bans from 
an international human rights perspective (§§ 51 – 60). 
5 HRC, General Comment No. 22(48), § 17. 
6 Bundesratsbechluß über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung, Nov. 29, 2009, 
Bundesblatt 3437, 3440 (2010). See L. LANGER, Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy? The Swiss Ban 
on Minarets, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 2010, 863 ff. 
7 On this topic, see generally A. AN–NA’IM, Human Rights in the Muslim World, 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 1990, 13 ff.: a general principle of the Islamic religious law, 
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actions: their reasons and meanings are to be found in the woman’s 
relations with others. The presence, the absence and the type of veil speaks 
of gender, religion, politics, ethnicity, profession and fashion to other 
people8. 
Religious clothes work in different ways within the different 
traditions: in Judaism, for example, the yarmulke is worn because of a 
religious obligation; for muslim women, the wearing of the hijab is a 
spiritual practice as well as a defining element of group identity, or a form 
of social obligation. The common feature of religious clothes is the 
centrality of such practices to the manifestation of religious belief. An 
Islamic Veil could mean: loyalty to tradition, belief in the chastity of 
women, religious identity, respect for wishes of parents and families, 
signal of not being sexually available or expression of cultural identity9 
Thus it is doubtful that, despite these acknowledged facts, some 
States seek to limit this aspect of the freedom to manifest one’s religion, as 
in the well known affaire du foulard, the case determined by French law 
proscribing the wearing of religious symbols in public schools10. 
Many States consider Islam, as manifested by the headscarf, a threat 
to the secular character of their system11. However the connection between 
the concept of a State’s religious neutrality and the banning of the Islamic 
Veil is not evident. The neutrality of the State needs to be understood as 
the consequence of the freedom of thought, conscience and religion of 
                                                                                                                                                       
known as Shari’a, is the al-hijab. In Arabic hijab means barrier or screen. This principle is 
founded on the fact that according to the Qu’ran women are supposed to stay at home 
and not leave it except when required to it by urgent necessity. When they are permitted 
to go out the home, they must do so with their bodies and faces covered. 
8 For example, in Iran head covering is mandatory. Full hijab is very rare and it is 
worn by the women of the Ahwazi Arab persecuted minority. It speaks of a kind of intra 
– Islamic national, linguistic and cultural resistance against oppression, rather than about 
religion. Islam without veil, www.wluml.org/node/6530. 
9 In the words of the German Constitutional Court, 3.6.2003, 2BvR 1436/02, 
www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen, § 52.  
10 Act no. 2004 – 228, 15.3.2004, www.legifrance.gouv.fr. Subsequently, see Act no. 2010 – 
1192, 11.10.2010 prohibiting the concealing of the face in public, Journal Officiel, 
12.10.2010, 18344, www.legifrance.gouv.fr. On this topic, see generally O. CAYLA, 
Dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public: l’hypocrisie du juge constitutionnel trahie par la 
sincérité des circulaires?, Recueil Dalloz, 2011, 1166 – 1170; R.W. HILL, The French Prohiition 
on Veiling in Public Places: Rights Evolution or Violation?, Oxford Journal of Law and Religion, 
2012, 1 ff.; A. FORNEROD, The Burqa Affair in France, in The Burqa Affair Across Europe 
(Between Public and Private Space), (A. Ferrari, S. Pastorelli eds.), 2013, 59 ff. 
11 P.G. DANCHIN, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in 
International Law, 33 Yale Journal of International Law, 2010, 21 – 22. 
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citizens12. Guaranteeing these freedoms, States assume neutrality. In fact, 
respect for different beliefs and convictions is a basic obligation for the 
State, which accepts that individuals may choose them freely and change 
their minds13. The State is able to guarantee the religious freedom of 
citizens and the non – discrimination on religious grounds, if it does not 
identify with any religion and is neutral14. It’s not clear why neutrality 
requires the banning of the religious symbols. 
Moreover, among the arguments advanced in the debate 
concerning the banning of the veil, we may find gender discrimination. 
On the one hand, the laws and regulations banning the islamic veil have 
been justified on the grounds that they protect the dignity and equal rights 
of women, help preserve public security and reflect national values, such 
as official secularism. On the other hand, such laws have been attacked on 
the basis that they undermine women’s rights to equal treatment, freedom 
of expression and of religion and are counterproductive to their aim of 
promoting integration. The roots of this debate may be found in the fact 
that the use of religious symbols to manifest one’s beliefs has been 
asserted to threaten the rights of others if it is associated with “ a definite 
and particular kind of religious culture”15. 
This article aims to investigate the complex problem of islamic 
symbols in the european context. Stepping back from the cases decided by 
the European Court of Human Rights, the article focuses not only on the 
place of Islamic clothing symbols within the normative structure of Article 
9 ECHR, but also on the broader international debates on prohibitions or 
regulations on religious symbols. These are part of other debates, 
concerning the position of religion in the public sphere, and not only the 
issue of wearing of religious symbols, but also the displaying of religious 
symbols16. 
                                                        
12 As affirmed by the German Constitutional Court in the case Kirchenbausteuer, 
14.12.1965, BVerfGE, 19, 206, 216. 
13 J.F. RENUCCI, Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights 
File No. 20, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2005, 22. 
14 See the case Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark (1976), App. No. 5095/71, 
5920/72, 5926/72, Series A, no. 23, § 53. In this case neutrality means that at schools all 
religious indoctrination is prohibited. 
15 J. FINNIS, Endorsing Discrimination Between Faiths: A Case of Extreme Speech?, in 
Extreme Speech and Democracy, 430, 436, I. Hare & J. Weinstein eds., 2009. 
16 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 70 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Grand Chamber Mar 18, 2011), 
http://www.echr.coe.int; in this case, the Grand Chamber reversed the judgment of the 
Second Chamber (Lautsi v. Italy, App. No., 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H. R., Second Section, Nov., 
3, 2009, http://www.echr.coe.int), holding that “the decision whether crucifixes should be 
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Moreover the article asks if different solutions could be found on 
the basis of a different notion of religious freedom in international law, 
bringing out the idea that a new concept, such as value pluralism, can 
offer a theoretical basis for religious freedom. This value pluralism 
compels us to accept that there is a plurality of ways of thinking about 
fundamental rights. So we should expect different approaches to 
toleration and different interpretations of neutrality.  
“Pluralism in Europe and the way diversity is treated in 
policymaking are sensitive issues”, according to the European 
Commission. The main idea is that research in social sciences and 
humanities can underpin the European capacity to respond to the growing 
religious and cultural diversity within European societies. Therefore, this 
paper focuses on the management of the value pluralism in religious 
matters as a fundamental way to achieve the social inclusion, which is one 
of the main goals of the Horizon 2020 strategy. In this context, it is well 
known that the European Union’s legislative measures make little 
reference to religious phenomena, and that religious matters are regulated 
at the national level. Nevertheless, EU decision – making has a direct 
impact on religious matters through directives, regulations and the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, while it is indirectly 
implemented through political acts17.  
 
 
2 - The veil before the European Court of Human Rights 
 
In many countries, there has been a significant case law concerning the 
wearing of islamic symbols, particularly in public institutions such as 
school, universities and public service offices – from British schoolgirls 
who did not find the school’s uniform sufficiently strict for their religious 
convictions18, to two muslim women who were refused a bus ride because 
                                                                                                                                                       
present in State – school classrooms is, in principle a matter falling within the margin of 
appreciation of the respondent State”. See § 68 and below § 3. 
17 A. FERRARI, S. PASTORELLI, The Burqa in Europe: European Institutions and the 
Comparative/Interdisciplinary Approach, in The Burqa Affair Across Europe (Between Public and 
Private Space), (A. Ferrari, S. Pastorelli eds.), 2013, 231. 
18 Regina (Begum) v. High School Governors [2007] 1 AC 100 ([2006] UKHL 15). This case 
involved a fourteen year old Muslim girl’s claim to freedom of religion under Article 9 
ECHR to wear the jilbab (a long cloak covering the whole body except the hands and face) 
without the shalwar kameez (traditional dress worn by both women and men in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India and Pakistan), allowed by a coeducational community 
school in Luton, if the pupils did not wish to wear the traditional school uniform. The 
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one had covered her face with a niqab19, to a school teacher who was 
banned from teaching in a Swiss primary school because she wore a 
headscarf20, to a university student in Turkey, who was prohibited from 
enrolling because she wished to wear a headscarf in her classrooms and 
examinations21, to a Muslim witness in New Zealand whose wearing of a 
veil over her face when giving evidence in a car theft trial was challenged 
by the defence. 
Bans on the wearing of the full face veil may be discussed from the 
perspective of freedom of religion (art. 9.2. of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), as well as from the perspective of freedom of 
expression (art. 10.2. of the ECHR). 
At the same time, on this topic, it is necessary to consider the range 
of different human rights and public interests put forward by States 
banning the veil, including women’s and children’s rights22. Finally, it is 
worthwhile pointing out that there is evidence to indicate that the wearing 
                                                                                                                                                       
House of Lords (now the United Kingdom Supreme Court) overturned the decision of 
the Court of Appeal, ruling that even if there had been an interference with Shabina 
Begum’s right to manifest her religion under Article 9(1), the school’s policy could be 
considered a justifiable limitation on that right under Article 9(2). The House of Lords 
held that schools in the UK have the right to introduce a uniform policy and the uniform 
policy in Denbigh School also accommodated as much as possible different cultural 
traditions. In any case it was possible for the complainant to choose another school which 
suited her dress preferences. Notwithstanding, the House of Lords hold that the practice 
of wearing jilbab was covered by the freedom of religion. See M. IDRISS, Dress Codes, the 
Right to Manifest Religion and the Human Rights Act 1998: The defeat of Shabina Begum in the 
House of Lords, Coventry Law Journal, 2006, 11; N. NATHWANI, Islamic Headscarves and 
Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the Relevant Case Law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 2007, 227 ff.; M. SSENYONJO, The Islamic 
Veil and Freedom of Religion, the Rights to Education and Work: a Survey of Recent International 
and National Cases, Chinese Journal of International Law, 2007, 675; M. HILL QC, Legal and 
Social Issues Concerning the Wearing of the Burqa and Other Head Coverings in the United 
Kingdom, in The Burqa Affair Across Europe (Between Public and Private Space), (A. Ferrari, S. 
Pastorelli eds.), 2013, 77 ff. 
19 BBC News 23 July 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-berkshire-10728912. 
20 Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001) Eur. Cour. HR 449. 
21 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2005], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H. R. 173, 165.  
22 About girls expelled from schools, as a result of the french legislation, see the 
observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child, CCPR/C/15/Add.240, §§ 25 – 
26; concerning the ban on schoolteachers wearing headscarves in Germany, see the 
Committee’s Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Germany, 
CRC/C/15/Add, 226, §§ 30 – 31. 
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of some symbols may affect other human rights such as the right to health 
(i.e. the problems caused by the burqa23). 
Some of these controversies focused principally on the rights of 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion as the principal rights at 
issue, in considering islamic symbols, and found their way to the 
European Court of Human Rights. The wearing of religious symbols is 
clearly a form of religious expression as well as a manifestation of one’s 
religious beliefs. On this concern, the European Court notes in fact that 
“all opinions or beliefs do not fall within the scope of art. 9, 1 c of the 
Convention”, because «as stated by the Commission the term “practices“ 
used in art. 9, par. 1, does not include any act which is motivated or 
influenced by a religion or a belief» 24, and beliefs are considered as 
“viewpoints that express a certain degree of strength, of seriousness and 
importance”25. Protection may be accorded to their manifestation in public 
or in private as a form of expression, by investigating the collective 
understanding of religion, to verify the legality of the conduct claimed by 
the applicant26.  
So, these instances, in their social dimension, can access the 
protection of Article 9, 1 ECHR only if they pass the test of seriousness and 
good faith. Moreover they can be subject to further limitations, if 
considered necessary to the needs of a democratic society, according to § 2 
of Article 9, such as public safety, security, public order, health or morals, 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation)27. For example the Court had held that the 
                                                        
23 See Physicians for Humans Rights, The Taliban’s War on Women: A Health and Human 
Rights Crisis in Afghanistan, 1998, available at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/the-
talibans-war-on-women.html. 
24 Pretty v. United Kingdom, [2002], ECHR, 2002 – III, 203 ff. 
25 Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, [1982], series A, n. 48, 36. 
26 Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, n. 55170/00 (2006): the case 
concerns a Macedonian coach of a power company who didn’t show up at work, having 
informed his superiors the day before that he wanted to celebrate two Islamic religious 
holidays. In both cases, the right to be absent from work (without deduction of salary) is 
recognised by a decree of the Ministry of Labour for all followers of Islam. In Jakòbski v. 
Poland, [2010], a prisoner complained of an infringement of his freedom of conscience and 
religion because the prison structure refused to serve him vegetarian food for the diet he 
followed because of his Buddhist religion. The Court accepted the applicant’ s petition, 
judging that the choice was “motivated or inspired by a religion and not unreasonable”. 
27 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has often been relied upon, in the 
European context, by the European Court of Human Rights in cases involving the 
wearing of religious symbols. It appears that the ECHR employs a wider margin of 
appreciation when it considers a form of expression as religious expression rather than 
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dissolution of a Turkish Islamic political party which had the goal of 
creating a society based on Sharia law was not opposed and incompatible 
with democracy and with the principles posed by the Convention28. In 
fact, in the second case of Refah, the Grand Chamber upheld a ban on the 
largest political party in Turkey, the Welfare Party, on the ground that its 
activities violated the constitutional principles of secularism and 
democracy. The Court, endorsing the findings of both the Turkish 
Constitutional Court and the majority of the Chamber of the Third Section 
of the European Court, asserted that “shariah is incompatible with the 
fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the Convention”, 
because it is a religion in which pluralism in the political sphere has no 
place. A different solution might be found, considering both Islamic Law, 
and the notion of the legal pluralism in the context of the ECHR, as 
suggested by Judge Kovler in his separate concurring opinion29. 
Thus, we may ask if the Islamic Veil is among the practices invoked 
as a manifestation of a religion or belief, protected under art. 9 ECHR. 
Generally, the European Court affirmed that a practice may be 
defined as a manifestation of religion protected under Article 9 ECHR if it 
follows a religious rule according to a credible source, independently of 
eventual differences of opinion concerning the interpretation of the rule. 
In the case Cha’are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France30, the ECtHR stated that ritual 
slaughter constitutes a rite the purpose of which is to provide Jews with 
meat from animals slaughtered in accordance with religious prescriptions, 
which is an essential practice of the Jewish religion, independently of the 
correct interpretation of Jewish religious sources. 
                                                                                                                                                       
political expression. Yet, that which will “likely cause substantial offence to persons of a 
particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time to time and from place to 
place, especially in an era characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and 
denominations”: Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2005], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, §§ 110 – 122. 
28 Refah Partisi v. Turkey [2003], Eur. Cour. N. 41340/98, Eur. Ct. , H. R. Rep. 1 (2003), 
35. 
29 Refah Partisi v. Turkey [2003], Eur. Cour. N. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1, 50 - 51 
(2003) (Kovler J. Concurring): “(…) the concept of a plurality of legal systems (…) is linked to 
that of legal pluralism and is well – established in ancient and modern legal theory and practice. 
Not only legal anthropology but also modern constitutional law accepts that under certain 
conditions members of minorities of all kinds may have more than one type of personal status. 
Admittedly, this pluralism, which impinges mainly on an individual’s private and family life, is 
limited by the requirements of the general interest. But it is of course more difficult in practice to 
find a compromise between the interests of the communities concerned and civil society as a whole 
than to reject the very idea of such a compromise from the outset”. 
30 Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France [2000], Eur. Cour. N. 27417/95, available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int. 
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Regarding the islamic practice of the veil, the jurisprudence does 
not seem to have recognised the protection provided by art. 9 ECHR on 
islamic clothing symbols, as already pointed out by the Commission. In 
Karaduman v. Turkey31, the European Commission of Human Rights 
(ECmHR) stated some preliminary indications subsequently followed by 
the ECHR in its approach to the issue of veil. In fact, as regards the Article 
9 complaint, the ECmHR was of the opinion that the article in question  
 
“does not always guarantee the right to behave in public in a way 
dictated by this conviction”, and that “the term practice, in the sense 
of paragraph 1 of Article 9 … does not denote any act motivated or 
inspired by a religion or a conviction” 32.  
 
Clearly, in this case the ECmHR did not appear to believe that the wearing 
of the headscarf, as such, fell within the scope of Article 9 ECHR33. 
Confirmation of this is provided by the decision in the case Dahlab 
v. Switzerland34. In this case, a Swiss primary school teacher converted to 
Islam and decided to wear her headscarf at work in 1991. Five years later, 
the Directorate General for Primary Education in the Canton of Geneva 
prohibited the applicant from wearing religious clothing at school, in the 
performance of her professional duties, on the grounds that it constituted 
an “obvious means of religious identification imposed by a teacher on her 
pupils, especially in a public, secular education system”, violating section 
                                                        
31 In the contemporaneous decisions, Karaduman v. Turkey, and Bulut v. Turkey, n. 
16278/90, [1993], the applicants, Muslim students of Ankara University, claimed the 
violation of their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion protected by art. 9 
ECHR, as the university regulation provided that the photo ID, for issuing the certificate 
of graduation, had to be bareheaded. The Commission stated that the claim was 
inadmissible, because the regulatory provision “does not conflict with freedom of 
religion, protected by art. 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the legislative 
provision by which a secular university, in order to ensure respect for the rights of 
freedom of all its students, requires that the degree provided by her does not reflect in 
any way the membership of a particular religious movement and that, therefore, it 
reproduced the photo figuring the pupil bareheaded in an estate according with that 
provision of a regulation”. 
32 Karaduman v. Turkey, and Bulut v. Turkey, n. 16278/90, [1993], §§ 6 – 7. 
33 In the case Karaduman v. Turkey, n. 16278/90, [1993], the applicant claimed that 
foreign nationals studying at Turkish universities enjoyed total freedom in respect of 
clothing, whereas Turkish women suffered from the mentioned restrictions, affecting 
their freedom of religion. This claim involving gender and nationality was not elaborated 
in the admissibility decision as the ECmHR declared it inadmissible due to the non – 
exhaustion of domestic remedies (Article 26 – now 35- ECHR). 
34 Dahlab v. Switzerland [2001], (2001) Eur. Cour. HR 447, § 2. 
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6 of the Public Education Act35. She refused, challenged the decision in the 
Swiss courts and, after loosing before the Swiss Federal Court, took her 
case to the European Court of Human Rights. She relied on Article 9 and 
Article 14 ECHR, alleging discrimination on the grounds of sex. 
Switzerland argued that the case was “manifestly ill founded” and should 
not proceed on the merits. The Court agreed with the Swiss Federal Court, 
relying on the margin of appreciation doctrine, to conclude that the 
measure was justified by the principles of neutrality and gender equality 
protected by the Swiss Constitution36. 
Moreover another line of argument descending from the Article 9 
ECHR could be the negative freedom of religion of children. The 
arguments seem to be the fact that it is easier to influence young children 
with religious messages than adults, and the negative freedom of religion 
of children needs more protection than the negative freedom of religion of 
adults. However if a teacher wears a headscarf without making religious 
declarations, it is difficult to see how children can be influenced, especially 
if it is a manifestation of a minority religion, in a society fundamentally 
pluralistic like the swiss one37. The perception of the ECtHR that the veil 
constitutes a threat for children is absolutely not at all convincing. 
As to the principle of gender equality, the ECtHR noted that the 
headscarf “appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid 
down in the Koran and which is hard to square with the principle of 
                                                        
35 Section 6 of the Public Education Act provides that “ The public education system 
shall ensure that the political and religious beliefs of pupils and parents are respected. 
Article 27 (3) of the Swiss Federal Constitution States that “it shall be possible for 
members of all faiths to attend state schools without being affected in any way in their 
freedom of conscience or belief”. 
36 Dahlab v. Switzerland [2001], (2001) Eur. Cour. HR 447, § 6. “The impugned decision 
is fully in accordance with the principle of denominational neutrality in schools, a 
principle that seeks both to protect the religion beliefs of pupil and parents and to ensure 
religious harmony…Schools would be in danger of becoming places of religious conflict 
if teachers were allowed to manifest their religious beliefs through their conduct and, in 
particular, their clothing…Here the appellant’s interest in obeying a precept laid down by 
her faith should be set against the interest of pupils and their parents in not being 
influenced or offended in their own beliefs, and the concern to maintain religious 
harmony in schools”. 
37 On the basis of these considerations, it appears irreconcilable with the Swiss 
constitutional bill of rights the Swiss constitutional ban adopted on 29 November 2009 on 
the construction of minarets in Switzerland. On this topic and on the conflict with the 
ECHR see L. LANGER, Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy? The Swiss Ban on Minarets, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, 2010, 863 ff. 
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gender equality”38. The ECtHR did not clarify what gender equality meant 
and the statement of the principle seems to go against Dahlab’s 
contention, under Article 14 ECHR, that the requirement that she stop 
wearing the headscarf discriminated against her as a woman. Finally, in 
Dahlab v. Switzerland, the ECtHR presented the Islamic headscarf as a 
“powerful religious symbol” and, as a such, already problematic for the 
freedoms of the others. Clearly, this ignores the complexity of the 
applicant’s attitude towards her headscarf- wearing. 
In Sahin v. Turkey39, the Grand Chamber of the Court upheld the 
headscarf ban under Articles 8, 9 and 14 of the ECHR and Article 2 of the 
First Protocol to the ECHR. Contrary to the Chamber’s 2004 ruling, the 
Grand Chamber held that the ban restricted Sahin’s religious expression in 
violation of article 9 (1), but was justified under Article 9 (2). 
The case involved a fifth – year medical student at the University of 
Istanbul who was denied enrollment, in her fifth year in the medical 
faculty of Istanbul University, on the grounds that she was wearing the 
islamic headscarf. The applicant came from a family of practicing Muslims 
and regarded it as her religious duty to wear the headscarf. She wore the 
headscarf during all her years of study at Bursa, and until 1998 in Istanbul. 
In February 1998, Istanbul University issued an administrative regulation 
prohibiting the admission to classes of students wearing the hijab, with the 
result that Leyla Sahin was refused admission to classes and examinations. 
Leyla Sahin was suspended for a semester in 1999, in part due to her 
protest against the university rules. The regulations were appealed to the 
Istanbul Administrative Court which dismissed the complaint because the 
regulatory power of the University had been exercised in accordance with 
relevant legislation and judgments of the Constitutional Courts and the 
Supreme Administrative Court. In 1999, Leyla Sahin enrolled at Vienna 
University in Austria. Before the European Court of Human Rights, Leyla 
Sahin complained of the violation of her right to freedom of religion under 
Article 9.  
The ECtHR focused on § 2 of Article 9 ECHR, which provides that 
freedom to manifest one’s religion is subject to  
 
“limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection 
of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others”.  
                                                        
38 Dahlab v. Switzerland [2001], (2001) Eur. Cour. HR 447, § 13. 
39 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99. 
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Therefore, in this case, no violation of Article 9 was found. The 
headscarf ban was considered in “its legal and social context”, within the 
constitutionally embedded fundamental principles of secularism and 
gender equality40. In fact, the Court held that the ban freed women from 
religious beliefs, that signify subordination, and liberated them from the 
pressures to adopt patriarchal practices41. According to the Court, national 
regulations could be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society” as 
they pursued the legitimate aims of protecting the “rights and freedoms of 
others” and “public order”42. 
Many justified criticisms have been made of the court’s judgment 
on several grounds: inadequate application of the margin of appreciation 
doctrine, narrow interpretation of the freedom of religion, imposition of 
“fundamentalist secularism”, adverse implications on Muslim women’s 
rights to education and presentation of Islam as a threat to democracy43. 
The decision, in this case, is quite different from the one adopted in 
the Dahlab case, not only because it concerns an Islamic Veil worn by a 
student at the university, while the other one regards an Islamic veil worn 
by a teacher in a primary school, but because the fundamental argument 
in the former decision is the fact that the veil worn by a teacher, who is a 
civil servant, can be authorized by the State and taken on by the State as 
its responsibility under the international law doctrine of state 
responsibility44, whereas headscarves worn by students and pupils cannot 
be treated in this manner. 
Therefore the argument concerning the State’s neutrality is more 
relevant for the Dahlab case than for the Sahin one. 
On the contrary, in the Sahin case, the argument concerning 
women’s discrimination is stronger than in the Dahlab one: the assertion 
that the hjiab is “imposed” on women is particularly relevant. Apparently, 
the reasoning of the Court on the “legal and social context” is promising. 
However, the reasoning was not developed properly, as the ECtHR did 
                                                        
40 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 112- 123.  
41 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99.  
42 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 105 – 106. 
43 D. DECKER, C. and M. LLOYDD, Case Comment: Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, European 
Human Rights Law Review, 2004, 672 ff; C. EVANS, The “Islamic Scarf” in the European 
Court of Human Rights, Melbourne Journal of Int. Law, 7, 2006, 52; C.D. LOVEJOY, A glimpse 
into the future: what Sahin v. Turkey means to France’s Ban on ostensibility religious symbols in 
public schools, Wisconsin International Law Journal, 2006, 661. 
44 See International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, annex to the General Assembly Resolution 56/83, 12.12.2001, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts (Article 4). 
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not consider that, within the European and global debate, the headscarf 
represents for women a “variety of meanings”45. Muslim women wear it 
for several reasons, some of which are expressions of autonomy. The veil 
might be imposed, but this should be demonstrated. All these criticisms 
are incorporated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens:  
 
“the principle of sexual equality can not justify prohibiting a woman 
from following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the 
contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted. Equality and non 
– discrimination are subjective rights which must remain under the 
control of those who are entitled to benefit from them” 46. 
 
Finally, in this case, the link to the notion of militant democracy 
asserted in the Refah case, in holding that the Islamic headscarf is a symbol 
of political Islam and thus a “genuine threat to republican values and civil 
peace”47, and to the fundamental principle of gender equality recognized 
in both the Turkish constitution and the ECHR is clear 48. In this case, the 
Court reiterates its acceptance of the Turkish state’s rationale and defers to 
the state’s judgment that any person wearing the headscarf in public 
institutions should be understood as making a statement promoting 
political Islam and endangering civil order. As the headscarf is assimilated 
to political Islam and political Islam is assimilated to a threat to 
democracy, the limitation on Sahin’s right to manifest her religious beliefs 
becomes “necessary” to maintain democracy. 
The case Dogru v. France49 involved an eleven year old French 
Muslim student who refused to remove her headscarf in physical 
education classes. The school expelled her because an internal school rule 
prohibited students from wearing ”conspicuous signs which are in themselves 
of proselytizing or discriminatory effect”50. The Court accepted the French 
government’s argument that the purpose of the restriction “was to adhere to 
the requirements of secularism in state schools”51. So, considering both Refah 
                                                        
45 D. LYON, D. SPINI, Unveiling the Headscarf Debate, Feminist Legal Studies, 2004, 333- 
345; C. MAHABIR, Adjudicating Pluralism: the Hijab, Law and Social Change in Post – 
Colonial Trinidad, Social and Legal Studies, 2004, 435 – 452; M. MAZER IDRISS, Laïcité and 
the Banning of the ‘Hijab’ in France, Legal Studies, 2005, 260 – 295. 
46 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, § 12. On this topic 
see specifically below § 3. 
47 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, 111. 
48 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, 110. 
49 Dogru v. France, N. 27058/05, Eur. H. R. Rep., 182. 
50 Dogru v. France, N. 27058/05, Eur. H. R. Rep., 186. 
51 Dogru v. France, N. 27058/05, Eur. H. R. Rep., 198. 
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and Sahin, the Court held that the restriction was justified under Article 9 
(2) as it was directed towards a legitimate aim in a democratic society52. 
This case is different from Sahin v. Turkey, because it considers the place of 
religious minorities in secular democracies; so we can see that according to 
the European Court the religious diversity is to be respected only on terms 
that conform to the majority’s conception of the public identity in the 
French nation (laïcité). The individual’s right to freedom of religion and 
manifestation of that religious belief is thus to be balanced against the 
state’s interest in the principle of neutrality. 
Again, in the case Aktas v. France53, the Court considered that it was 
legitimate to exclude from school a girl who refused to uncover her head 
during physical education classes, according to art. 9, § 2 ECHR. 
Differently, in Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey54, the Court deemed 
that the general ban on wearing religious symbols in any public place, 
which is present in the Turkish legal system, was not justified by the 
requirements of the notion of Turkish secularity in the case of ordinary 
citizens. The case involved Turkish nationals, who were convicted for 
their touring the streets of the city wearing the distinctive dress code of 
their religious group Aczimendi tarikatÿ. The Court distinguishes this case 
from the Leyla Sahin one, as the applicants wore the garments “in public 
areas that were open to all such as streets or public places”55. About the 
national margin of appreciation, in this case the Court «adds however that 
public spaces open to all do not fall within the "special importance given 
to the role of the national decision-making body”»56. 
From this perspective, in this case, national laws prohibiting the 
veil in all public spaces, regardless of the specific status of the people 
concerned, seem to be considered by the Court as a violation of art. 9 
ECHR, because the statements contained in such laws are not 
proportionate to the needs of a secular, democratic society, if they do not 
                                                        
52 Dogru v. France, N. 27058/05, Eur. H. R. Rep., 196 - 200: “(…) religious freedom thus 
recognised and restricted by the requirements of secularism appears legitimate in the light of the 
values underpinning the Convention”. 
53 Aktas v. France, App. no. 43563/08 (2009), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/ 
/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93697. 
54 Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, App. no. 41135/98 (2010). On this case see J.F. 
FLAUSS, Actualité de la Convention Européenne des droits de l’homme (septembre 2009 – 
février 2010), Actualité Juridique Droit Administratif, 2010, 998; J.P. MARGUÉNAUD, La 
liberté de porter des vêtements religieux dans le lieux publics ouverts à tous, Recueil Dalloz, 2010, 
682. 
55 Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, App. no. 41135/98 (2010), § 34. 
56 Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, App. no. 41135/98 (2010), § 49. 
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concern the concrete needs of public order or safety. Therefore, in the 
balancing exercise between individual rights and State interests, the latter 
are understood as the prevention of religious strife, a concern scarcely 
demonstrated to be coextensive with the mere presence of religious 
symbols.  
 
 
3 - Religious Symbols in Article 9 ECHR case law and women’s 
religious freedom in Europe 
 
Article 9 (1) ECHR provides : 
 
”Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religious … freedom, either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance”. 
 
In relation to the cases concerning the headscarf as a religious 
symbol, the European Court of Human Rights has adopted a legal 
reasoning defined “liberal anti – pluralism”57, above all in comparison with 
the jurisprudence developed by the Court, regarding the claims made by 
Christian groups. 
Despite the fact that the right to have or maintain a religious 
tradition is widely granted in Kokkinakis58, and the right to be free from 
injury to religious feelings is well recognized in Wingrove and Otto 
Preminger59, the scope of Article 9 is read narrowly in case law concerning 
                                                        
57 P.G. DANCHIN, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, in 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 32, 2011, 45. 
58 Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/98, 260 Eur. Ct. H. R., (ser. A), at 3, 11 (1993). In 
this case, Greece prosecuted a Jehova’s witness, who called at the home of a lady and 
engaged a discussion with her, and was arrested and prosecuted for proselytism directed 
toward a member of the dominant religion, Christian Eastern Orthodoxy. As the Court 
distinguished between proper proselytism which is protected and improper proselytism 
which may be prohibited, it finally held that a state may legitimately consider it 
necessary to take measures aimed at repressing certain forms of conduct (in this case 
proselytism), judged incompatible with the respect for the freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion of others. This ruling was confirmed in Larissis v. Greece, App. 
No. 23371/94, 26377/94 and 26378/94, Reports 1998 – I; See N. NATHWANI, Islamic 
Headscarves and Human Rights, 237; P.G. DANCHIN & L. FORMAN, The Evolving 
Jurisprudence of the European Court and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in Protecting the 
Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe, 192, 200 – 10 (P.G. Danchin & E.A. 
Cole eds., 2002). 
59 Wingrove and Otto – Preminger – Institut v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A), at. 1, 17 
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islamic symbols: in Dogru, to deny the claims of Muslim minorities in 
European nation – States to manifest their religious beliefs and collective 
identities, in Sahin, Dogru, and Aktas, to recognize wide States margins of 
appreciations to limit religious freedom on the grounds of protecting the 
public order values of secularism and neutrality.  
In all the decisions described above60, the particular position of the 
applicants towards the organisational structures of the State has justified a 
legitimate restriction on the use of the veil, while in relation to Kokkinakis, 
the Court has acknowledged the collective dimension of freedom of 
religion and belief and the role of Christianity in the way of life of the 
affected communities. 
The approach to the presence of Islamic religious symbols in the 
public sphere seems particularly inconsistent or discriminatory, in light of 
the Court’s decision in Lautsi61, that the compulsory displaying of 
crucifixes in the classroom did not breach Italy’s Convention obligation. 
While in 2009, the Second Chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights held unanimously that the presence of crucifixes in Italian public 
school classrooms violates the right of children to religious freedom under 
Article 962, in 2011, the Grand Chamber reversed the judgment, holding 
that “the decision whether crucifixes should be present in State – school 
classrooms is, in principle, a matter falling within the margin of 
appreciation of the respondent State” 63. The Grand Chamber agreed with 
the Second Chamber that the right to religious freedom in Article 9 
includes the freedom not to belong to a religion and imposes a duty on the 
State of “neutrality and impartiality”64. However, about the scope of 
Article 9, the Court held that “a crucifix on a wall is an essentially passive 
symbol … and cannot be deemed to have an influence on pupils 
                                                                                                                                                       
– 18 (1994). In this case, the Court upheld the Austrian government’s seizure of the film 
Das LieberKonzil on the basis that it constituted an attack on the Christian religion by 
violating “the respect for the religious feelings of believers as guaranteed in Article 9 … 
by provocative portrayals of objects of religious veneration ...”. 
60 See § 2. 
61 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 70 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Grand Chamber Mar 18, 2011), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
62 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No., 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H. R., Second Section, Nov., 3, 2009, 
http://www.echr.coe.int), §§ 48 – 58: ”The compulsory display of a symbol of a particular 
faith in the exercise of public authority in relation to specific situations subject to 
governmental supervision, particularly in classrooms, restricts the right of parents to 
educate their children in conformity with their convictions and the right of 
schoolchildren to believe or not believe”. 
63 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 70. 
64 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 60. 
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comparable to that of didactic speech or participation in religious 
activities” 65, and moreover that “the decision whether or not to perpetuate 
a tradition falls in principle within the margin of appreciation” 66. In light 
of these arguments, it’s clear that the European Court fails to explain how 
the diversity of religious values and traditions in the public sphere of 
European States is compatible with the Court’s conceptions of neutrality 
and secularism underpinning the decisions about islamic symbols67. 
In Lautsi68, the European Court rejects any notion that to be 
democratic you must not be religious and, while insisting on respect for 
individual freedom of religion and belief, recognizes that the State may 
define itself by reference to the religious heritage, symbols and collective 
identity of its people69.  
Moreover, the arguments of the Lautsi decision fail to explain how 
the rich diversity of religious values and traditions in the european States 
is compatible with the Court’s earlier more demanding conceptions of 
neutrality and secularism70. On this last concern, some interesting 
suggestions may be found in the separate concurring opinion of Judge 
Power. Judge Power asserts that neutrality does not require a secularist 
approach, distinguishing clearly the crucifix from other symbols:  
 
“Italy opens up the school environment to a variety of religions and 
there is no evidence of any intolerance shown towards non – 
believers or those who don’t have religious philosophical convictions. 
Islamic headscarves may be worn. The beginning and end of 
Ramadan are ‘often celebrated’. Within such a pluralist and tolerant 
context, a Christian symbol on a classroom wall presents yet another 
and a different world view. The presentation of an engagement with 
different points of view is an intrinsic part of the educative process. It 
                                                        
65 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 72. 
66 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 68. 
67 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, 110; 
Dogru v. France, App. no. 27058/05, 49 Eur. H. R. Rep., 179, 182 (2008). 
68 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, § 70 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Grand Chamber Mar 18, 2011), 
http://www.echr.coe.int. 
69 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, §§ 73 - 74 (Eur. Ct. H. R. Grand Chamber Mar 18, 
2011), http://www.echr.coe.int.: This case is distinguished from Dahlab v. Switzerland on 
the bases that crucifixes are “not associated with compulsory teaching of Christianity”; 
Italy “opens up the school environment in parallel to other religions”. Moreover there 
was no claim that “the presence of the crucifix in classrooms has encouraged the 
development of teaching practices with a proselytizing tendency”. 
70 See J. WEILER, Lautsi: Crucifix in the Classroom, 21 Eur. J. Int. Law, 1,1 (2010), 
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/21/1/1985.pdf; P.G. DANCHIN, Islam in the Secular Nomos, p. 59. 
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acts as a stimulus to dialogue. A truly pluralist education involves 
exposure to a variety of different ideas, including those which are 
different from one’s own. Dialogue becomes possible and, perhaps, is 
at its most meaningful where there is a genuine difference of opinion 
and an honest exchange of views”71. 
 
In the opinion of Judge Power it is fundamental to reply to the 
claim that the presence of religious symbols in the public sphere violates 
the negative freedom of followers of other religions or non religionists, 
that a pluralist and inclusive approach by the State is more necessary than 
an exclusionary and secularist one. 
Perhaps, the inclusive approach suggested by Judge Power is the 
way to solve the contradictions characterizing the article 9 ECHR 
jurisprudence, which are, on the one hand, finding a danger of pressure or 
proselytizing when a medical student wears an Islamic headscarf to a 
public university72, but not when a State officially adopts a majority 
religious symbol in its public schools73, and, on the other, finding the 
decision “whether or not to perpetuate a religious tradition in the public 
sphere to be a violation of the principle of secularism in a Muslim – 
majority state74, but within the margin of appreciation in a Christian – 
majority state75. 
Moreover, the inclusive approach should consider that wearing the 
Islamic headscarf has no fixed meaning76. 
Muslim women wear the hijab for several reasons, often conflicting, 
some of which are expressions of autonomy77. These reasons vary, 
depending on the country specifically considered. In many Islamic 
countries wearing the veil is an obligation, an imposition often legitimated 
by the institutions and it is widely imposed on women both by the family 
and by the community. In Europe the situation is different. There are 
women who wear the veil because they are obliged to by their father, 
husband, family or by the community in which they live, but there are also 
                                                        
71 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, §§ 2. 10 (Power J., separate concurring), 45 – 46. 
72 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], Eur. Cour. N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99. 
73 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, §§ 73 - 74. 
74 Refah Partisi v. Turkey [2003], Eur. Cour. N. 41340/98, 37 Eur. H. R. Rep. 1, 50 - 51. 
75 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, §§ 73 - 74. 
76 D. LYON, D. SPINI, Unveiling the Headscarf Debate, Feminist Legal Studies, 2004, 333- 
345; C. MAHABIR, Adjudicating Pluralism: the Hijab, Law and Social Change in Post – 
Colonial Trinidad, Social and Legal Studies, 2004, 435 – 452; M. MAZER IDRISS, Laïcité and 
the Banning of the ‘Hijab’ in France, Legal Studies, 2005, 260 – 295. 
77 P.G. DANCHIN, Islam in the Secular Nomos, p. 63. 
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women who freely choose to do so. The relationship between women, 
culture and rights is complex and its simplification, banning the veil in 
Europe, does not lead to greater dignity and autonomy for women78. 
In fact, in my opinion, equality and non – discrimination should be 
considered in the right approach, that is well summarized in the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Françoise Tulkens in her dissenting opinion 
on the case Leyla Sahin79:  
 
«the principle of sexual equality can not justify prohibiting a woman 
from following a practice which, in the absence of proof to the 
contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted. Equality and non 
– discrimination are subjective rights which must remain under the 
control of those who are entitled to benefit from them. “Paternalism“ 
of this sort runs counter to the case law of the Court, which has 
developed a real right to personal autonomy on the basis of Article 8» 
… ”A general prohibition of wearing the burqa and the niqab would 
deny women who freely desire to do so their right to cover their 
face”80.  
 
This suggests that in both Dahlab and Sahin, the headscarf was 
given a highly abstract meaning of a religious symbol detrimental to 
gender equality, but the European Court did not attempt to give the 
principle of gender equality any specific content, which may have 
included some elaboration for the benefit of the person that the principle 
seeks to protect. This approach was overshadowed by the ECtHR’s further 
interpretation of the “Islamic Veil” as irreconcilable with gender equality 
in all cases. 
The necessity of a structured meaning of the gender equality 
principle is recently reaffirmed in the resolution 1743 of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe81 where we can read: 
”The veiling of women, especially full veiling through the burqa or 
the niqab, is often perceived as a symbol of the subjugation of women 
to men, restricting the role of women within society, limiting their 
professional life and impeding their social and economic activities. 
Neither the full veiling of women, nor even the headscarf, are 
                                                        
78 M. MALIK, Complex Equality: Muslim Women and the Headscarf, Droit et Societé, 2008, 
127. 
79 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, § 12. 
80 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, Diss. Tulkens, § 16. 
81 Council of Europe (2010), Resolution n. 1743, 23 June 2010, Islam, Islamism and 
Islamophobia in Europe, Strasbourg, available at http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link=/Do 
cuments/AdoptedText/ta10/ERES1743.htm. 
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recognized by all Muslims as a religious obligation of Islam, but they 
are seen by many as a social and cultural tradition. The Assembly 
considers that this tradition could be a threat to women’s dignity and 
freedom. No woman should be compelled to wear religious apparel 
by her community or family (…) Article 9 of the Convention includes 
the right of individuals to choose freely to wear or not to wear 
religious clothing in private or in public. Legal restrictions to this 
freedom may be justified where necessary in a democratic society, in 
particular for security purposes or where public or professional 
functions of individuals require their religious neutrality or that their 
face can be seen. However, a general prohibition of wearing the 
burqa and the niqab would deny women who freely desire to do so 
their right to cover their face. In addition, a general prohibition might 
have the adverse effect of generating family and community pressure 
on Muslim women to stay at home”. 
 
Thus, a general ban of headscarves from schools might protect 
those girls who do not want to wear headscarves, but will be harsh on 
those girls who consider it important for their cultural and religious 
identity and as a symbol of respect for their tradition. A general ban 
cannot be justified by reference to its protection element for young girls, 
because it is an excessive measure which is not proportionate to its goal82. 
Therefore, it’s clear that, to extend the effective individual and 
collective aspects of religious freedom, a different approach should be 
adopted. In this case the problem regards women who are part of minority 
cultures in Europe; so it is necessary to give them a hearing in order to 
provide concrete solutions and to identify effective strategies for their 
integration. The complexity of the condition of muslim women in Europe 
requires structured actions and instruments and not measures concerning 
only a specific garment. Perhaps a good model to protect minorities’ 
religious rights is the Indian one, where religious freedom consists in the 
State giving various religious groups juridical autonomy over family 
affairs in the form of family or personal status laws83. The positive 
autonomy of women of a certain ethnic background should be encouraged 
by publicly valuing their ethnic identity, by highlighting the plurality of 
lifestyles compatible with this ethnic identity. 
In light of these considerations, the perspective adopted by the 
ECtHR about women’s rights seems to be self – contradictory, if we 
                                                        
82 N. NATHWANI, Islamic Headscarves and Human Rights, 243. 
83 T. MAHMOOD, Religion, Law and Judiciary in Modern India, 2006, BYU L. Rev., 755 
(2006). 
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consider that after Dahlab and Sahin, the Court, in Ahmet Arslan and others 
v. Turkey84, deemed that the general ban on wearing religious symbols in 
any public place, present in the Turkish legal system, was not justified. 
The logical conclusion of the Court’s perspective would be that the veils 
should be banned everywhere, not only in schools, as suggested in the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens in Sahin85. 
Perhaps, in this context, the right to the wearing of the headscarf 
could be founded on Article 8 ECHR, as suggested by Judge Tulkens 
considering that the European Court appears “to paternalistically deny the 
applicant’s right to personal autonomy developed on the basis of Article 
8”86. However the application of Article 8 which protects the right to 
respect for private life could destabilize the meanings of the Islamic Veil. 
According to the ECHR, the rights protected by Article 8 “are more 
fundamental than those protected by Article 9”87 and so this legal basis 
could undermine the ECtHR’s theory of “secularism” and “gender 
equality” in the case law regarding headscarves. 
 
 
4 - Islamic Symbols and European Institutions. Indirect Discrimination? 
 
In the decisions described above, the European Court of Human Rights 
often implements the need to impose restrictions on religious symbols in 
order “to reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that 
everyone’s beliefs are respected”88. This approach is apparently in keeping 
with the principles stated in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union – 
TEU: 
 
”The Union is founded on values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy (…) including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. These values are common to the member States in a 
society characterised by pluralism, by non discrimination”. 
 
Moreover the ECtHR case law is in keeping with the provisions of 
Article 17 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
                                                        
84 Ahmet Arslan and others v. Turkey, App. no. 41135/98 (2010).  
85 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, Diss. Tulkens, § 12. 
86 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [2007], N. 44774/98, Eur. Ct. H. R. Rep. 99, Diss. Tulkens, 
ibidem. 
87 A. VAKULENKO, “Islamic Headscarves” and the European Convention on Human 
Rights: an Intersectional Perspective, Social and Legal Studies, 2007, 196. 
88 Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H. R. § 33. 
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where it refers to religious associations and communities and non – 
confessional organisations, respecting the different national identities 
(article 4 TEU). In fact the European Union must relate with social groups 
in the same way, independently of their religious nature. Moreover, the 
recognition of the national margin of appreciation in the symbols’ 
regulation in the public sphere, as well as in the private one, affects the 
contents of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
recognized also by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 21)89, 
which, with the Treaty of Lisbon90, has acquired the same value as the 
Treaties91. 
Other rules concerning religious symbols may be found within the 
Treaty of Lisbon. While Article 17 TFEU refers the regulation of religious 
organisations as well as that of non confessional organisations to national 
legislators, Article 19 provides some guarantees concerning measures 
necessary to combat all forms of discrimination, including those based on 
religion or belief.  
The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion coincides 
with the “freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or 
in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion 
or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and ritual observance" (article 9, § 
1 ECHR, art. 10 § 1 Charter). The coherence between the Charter and the 
Convention regarding the meaning of this rule is ensured by article 52 § 3 
of the EU Charter. Setting the scope of rights and principles of the Charter 
and establishing criteria for their interpretation, this rule prevents conflicts 
of interpretation on the meaning to attribute to the two catalogues of 
rights and gives the monopoly of interpretation on the rights affirmed in 
the same way in the two acts to the ECtHR. In these cases it is possible to 
affirm that the EU has in fact acceded to ECHR92. 
                                                        
89 Proclaimed in 2000, the Charter has become legally binding on the EU with the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on 1st December 2009, just like the EU Treaties 
themselves. 
90 Treaty of Lisbon, OJ, C 306, 17.12.2007. 
91 Article 10, § 1, of the Charter States:” Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and 
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private, to manifest 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance”. 
92 Article 6, § 2 of the TEU, states the commitment of the European Union to accede to 
the ECHR. This accession was proposed several times (in 1979, in 1990 and in 1993). The 
Court of Justice in its opinion 2/94 (28.3.1996) noted that the Community had no 
competence to accede to the ECHR, due to the limits of Article 308 TEC. The legal basis 
for accession to the ECHR was introduced through the provision of the Article 6, § 2, 
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However, the effectiveness of these principles depends on the EU 
Court of Justice. On this concern, it must be pointed out that, in the case of 
coincident rights, asserted by the ECHR and by the European Charter, the 
protection granted by the Charter may never be at a lower level than that 
provided by the ECHR. While the ECtHR indicates the minimum levels of 
protection of coincident rights to the EU Court of Justice, due to the 
compatibility clause of the European Charter, the Court of Justice can 
                                                                                                                                                       
TEU. The membership will depend on the member States meeting within the European 
Council. In the ECHR, the legal basis for the accession of the EU is provided for by 
Article 59, § 2 (“the European Union may accede to this Convention”), as amended by 
Protocol No. 14 to the ECHR which entered into force on 1 June 2010. On 26 May 2010, 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe gave an ad-hoc mandate to its 
Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) to elaborate with the EU the necessary 
legal instrument for the EU’s accession to the ECHR. On the EU side, the EU Justice 
Ministers gave the European Commission on 4 June 2010 the mandate to conduct the 
negotiations on their behalf. Official talks on the European Union's accession to the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) started on 7 July 2010. Thorbjørn 
Jagland, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, and Viviane Reding, Vice-
President of the European Commission, marked the beginning of this joint process at a 
meeting in Strasbourg. The CDDH entrusted the task of elaborating an accession 
instrument to an informal group of 14 members (7 coming from member States of the EU 
and 7 coming from non-member States of the EU), chosen on the basis of their expertise. 
Between July 2010 and June 2011, this informal working group (CDDH-UE) held in total 
eight working meetings with the European Commission, reporting regularly to the 
CDDH on progress and on outstanding issues. In the context of these meetings, the 
informal group also held two exchanges of views with representatives of civil society, 
who regularly submitted comments on the working documents. In June 2011, the CDDH-
UE finalised its work by submitting to the CDDH a draft accession agreement together 
with its explanatory report. In the context of the regular meetings which take place 
between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, delegations from both European courts discussed the accession of the EU to the 
Convention on 17 January 2011. In particular, they addressed the question of the future 
relationship between the two European courts concerning certain cases brought against 
the EU under the ECHR system. In October 2011, the CDDH discussed the draft 
instruments and, given the political implications of some of the pending problems, 
agreed to transmit a report and the draft instruments to the Committee of Ministers for 
consideration and further guidance. On 13 June 2012, the Committee of Ministers 
instructed the CDDH to pursue negotiations with the European Union, in an ad hoc 
group “47+1”, with a view to finalising without delay the accession instruments. 
Negotiators of the 47 Council of Europe member States and the European Union have 
finalised the draft accession agreement of the European Union to the European 
Convention on Human rights. The EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg will now be asked 
to give its opinion on the text. Accession of the EU to the ECHR will strengthen the 
protection of human rights in Europe, by ultimately submitting the EU and its legal acts 
to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. 
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draw up higher levels of protection than those of Strasbourg (Article 52, 
par. 3 Charter). 
Therefore, to identify the meaning of Article 10 of the EU Charter, it 
is necessary to consider the Strasbourg case law, and the consideration of 
the right to wear the veil as an expression of freedom of conscience and 
religion. However the same right may have very different effectiveness, 
depending on the judge involved and on the protection provided in the 
case.  
As a result of the mandatory nature of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and due to 
the fact that religious symbols cross several areas of EU competence, it is 
conceivable that the EU Court of Justice issue a decision concerning the 
prohibition to wear the veil in public. If this prohibition inhibited the free 
movement of workers or the possibility to access to a workplace, the Court 
could consider the lawfulness of the national measure with respect to the 
Treaties, without taking account of the religious implications that would 
be involved in the case93. If the Court did not find “any limitations 
justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health” 
(Article 45, § 3 TFEU)94, it could decide that there has been a violation of 
EU law granting the right to free movement of persons. 
At the same time, the European Commission could penalise a State, 
by means of an infringement procedure (Articles 258 – 260 TFEU), if a 
general prohibition of the veil could be deemed give rise to religious 
discrimination, relevant in the perspective that the homogenization of the 
laws of member States is supported by several acts, such as the Directive 
n. 2000/78 EC95, concerning other grounds of discrimination, including 
religion. In the European process of development of anti – discrimination 
legislation, we may consider, within the scope of this paper, the concept of 
indirect discrimination. 
Indirect discrimination is an apparently neutral provision, criterion 
or practice which would put individuals having one of the features 
accepted as grounds of discrimination (e.g. religion) at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other individuals, unless that provision is 
                                                        
93 See Court of Justice, 4 December 1974, Van Duyn v. Home Office, No. 41/74, ECR, 
1974, 1337. In this case, the Court has stated that it cannot make assessments of merit of 
the danger to society of religiously motivated behavior. 
94 Court of Justice, 4 December 1974, Van Duyn v. Home Office, No. 41/74, ECR, 1974, 
1337. 
95 Directive n. 2000/78/EC of Council, 27 November 2000, “establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and working”, OJ L 303/2000. 
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justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. 
In some cases, indirect discrimination have been identified by 
national judges in relation to religious symbols, such as the sikh turban96. 
In labour law, there are cases which confirm that dismissals founded on 
the banning of the veil are unlawful97.  
More generally the Human Rights Committee, in its 
Communication no. 208/198698 recognized that the requirement that a 
hard hat be worn at work can be seen as a “discrimination de facto” 
against individuals of the Sikh religion, like the author of the 
communication, Mr. Singh Binder, canadian citizen, born in India, who 
wore a turban in his daily life and refused to wear safety headgear during 
his work99. Recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, in its General Comment No. 20100, defines indirect discrimination 
as referring to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at face 
value, but have a disproportionate impact on the exercise of Covenant 
rights, as distinguished by prohibited grounds of discrimination.  
Finally, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, and due to 
the fact that religious symbols cross the areas of EU competence, the UN 
approach about indirect discrimination, produced by the religious 
clothing symbols, could be followed also by the European Union 
Institutions. 
 
 
5 - Conclusive Remarks 
                                                        
96 See i.e. the House of Lords (now the United Kingdom Supreme Court) decision, 
24.3.1983, Mandla v. Dowell Lee (1983) 2 AC 548. In this case, a sikh boy was refused 
admission to a school based on the Christian faith because he insisted on wearing the 
turban. The Court did not accept the justification offered by the school that the turban 
was an outward manifestation of non – Christian faith, because the no – turban rule 
adopted by the school was discriminatory in itself. On this see N. Nathwani, Islamic 
Headscarves and Human Rights, 248 ff. 
97 See i.e. Bundesarbeitsgericht, 10.10.2002, 2 AZR 472/01. 
98 Human Rights Committee, Karnel Singh Binder v. Canada, Communication No. 
208/1986, (CCPR/C/37/D/208/1986), 9.11.1989, www.un.otg. 
99 In the case, the canadian legislation, requiring that workers in federal employment 
be protected from injury and electric shock by the wearing of hard hats is to be regarded 
a reasonable limitation to the individual’s religious freedom. 
100 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment 
No. 20: Non-discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 2 July 2009, E/C.12/GC/20, 
available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4a60961f2.html. 
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Multicultural Europe is increasingly debating about the complex 
relationship between personal freedom, religious freedom and public 
spaces. Limitations on personal freedoms seem to be justified in public 
space, according to the fundamental principles of neutrality, secularity, on 
which the European legal cultures are based. 
The right to veil may be considered in this context as a contentious 
one. The relationship between women’s rights, States’ neutrality, 
secularism, and the veil is problematic because wearing religious clothing 
symbols is deemed to be an expression of religious freedom, but also an 
expression of discrimination necessary to forbid. 
The focus of recent case law, developed by the European Court of 
Human Rights, (ECtHR) has been on national laws, which proscribe the 
wearing of religious symbols in certain public places, and on the claims 
more generally to religious and cultural freedom of Muslim minorities in 
European States. Stepping back from these cases, the possible contrast 
between value pluralism as a basis for religious freedom in international 
law, and other fundamental rights (i.e. women’s rights, children’s rights) 
becomes clear. By recognizing the intrinsic connection between individual 
rights and communal goods, value pluralism opens new pathways for 
enforcing human rights. 
In the words of the Parliamentary Assembly of the European 
Council  
 
“ (…) Legal restrictions to this freedom may be justified where 
necessary in a democratic society, in particular for security purposes 
or where public or professional functions of individuals require their 
religious neutrality or that their face can be seen. However, a general 
prohibition of wearing the burqa and the niqab would deny women 
who freely desire to do so their right to cover their face. In addition, a 
general prohibition might have the adverse effect of generating 
family and community pressure on Muslim women to stay at home”. 
 
This strategy has been analyzed in the perspective of Horizon 2020. 
In this context, it has been pointed out that it appears in keeping with one 
of the main goals of the EU, social inclusion, within the complex human 
rights common framework pointed out by the European Charter as well as 
by the ECHR: the discrimination caused by the national banning of the 
veil could be penalised by the European Institutions and consequently by 
the ECHR. Therefore studies on the management of the growing religious 
pluralisation and diversity become fundamental. 
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Perhaps the common framework of these solutions could be found 
in the effective neutrality towards the religious symbols, generally 
considered “the only possible synthesis through which the European 
institutions can subsume different national experiences regarding the 
phenomenon of religion within a common European law of religion”101.  
However the accession of the European States to the European 
Convention on Human Rights and to the European Union did not achieve 
the homogeneisation in the protection of rights concerning religious 
topics. This consideration is confirmed by the various national rules about 
religious symbols, aided by the national margin of appreciation 
recognised by the European Court of Human Rights as well as by the 
European Institutions. In some cases the state authorizes the displaying of 
religious symbols, not proselytizing (like the crucifix in Italy); in others, 
the State bans the displaying of such symbols (like France, Spain and Italy 
for the burqa and the niqab). 
In this context, we may ask if the European Court of Human Rights 
and the European Institutions may find the right way to a unitary 
european model. 
The recent decisions of the Strasbourg Court on national bans of the 
use of the veil and the european rules highlight that two conflicting 
models seem to be equally accepted102: the multicultural one, in which the 
community prevails over the individual, on the assumption of the 
acceptance that all cultures are placed on the same level, having equal 
relevance; the intercultural one, in which the individual prevails over the 
minority community whose interests are subordinated to those of the 
individuals, as pluralism is limited in the name of the common values of 
the community – state. 
My opinion is that, to avoid these evident contradictions, religious 
convictions must be considered in the right light, or simply for what they 
are. 
Real pluralism may be effective, only considering the social 
importance of religious traditions. The Italian government, arguing before 
the ECHR that the crucifix “was both the symbol of Italian history and 
culture and consequently of Italian identity, and the symbol of the 
principles of equality, liberty and tolerance, as well as of the State’s 
secularism”103, aimed to transform one religious tradition into a general 
                                                        
101 A. FERRARI, S. PASTORELLI, The Burqa in Europe, p. 243. 
102 C. W. Jr. DURHAM, D. M. KIRKHAM, T. LINDHOLM, Islam and Political – 
Cultural Europe, 2012. 
103 Lautsi v. Italy, App. No., 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H. R., Second Section, Nov., 3, 2009, § 68. 
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norm. This is the real threat to tolerance of other symbols and traditions, 
appearing in the multicultural model as well as in the intercultural one:  
 
«There is a deep contestation about the most suitable way to regulate 
the symbolic and iconographic entanglement of Church and State. 
The laïque position is surely not "neutral" about that contestation. It is 
a much polar position as is the "non – laïque" position. It does not 
simply choose a side. It is a side»104. 
 
In conclusion, as it is generally recognized that the European 
version of the "non – laïque" State is important in the approach to 
tolerance and to religious pluralism, it is clear that, by acknowledging the 
mainstream european Christian heritage, the equal place of all the 
religious convictions and symbols could be more effectively guaranteed. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Religious freedom within Europe and the place of Islam within Europe are of 
particular contemporary interest. The focus of recent case law developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been on national laws which 
proscribe the wearing of religious symbols in certain aspects of the public sphere, 
and on the claims more generally to religious and cultural freedom of Muslim 
minorities in European states. Stepping back from these cases, this Article aims at 
a theoretical analysis of the subject, involving the contrast between value 
pluralism as a basis for religious freedom in international law, and other 
fundamental rights, i.e. women’s or children’s rights. By recognizing the intrinsic 
connection between individual rights and communal goods, value pluralism 
opens new pathways for enforcing human rights.  
                                                        
104 J. WEILER, Editorial, State and Nation; Church, Mosque and Synagogue-The Trailer, 
Int’l J. Con. L., 2010, 157; T. SAVAGE, Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing, 
The Washington Qaurterly, 2004, 25 ff. 
